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The relationship between the size of a market and the competitiveness of the 
market has been of long-standing interest to IO economists. Empirical studies 
have used the relationship between the size of the geographic market and both 
the number of ﬁ  rms in the market and the average sales of the ﬁ  rms to draw 
inferences about the degree of competition in the market. This paper extends this 
framework to incorporate the analysis of entry and exit ﬂ  ows. A key implication 
of recent entry and exit models is that current market structure will likely depend 
upon the history of past participation. The paper explores these issues empirical-
ly by examining producer dynamics for two health service industries, dentistry 
and chiropractic services. We ﬁ  nd that the number of potential entrants and past 
number of incumbent ﬁ  rms are correlated with current market structure. The em-
pirical results also show that as market size increases the number of ﬁ  rms rises 
less than proportionately, ﬁ  rm size increases, and average productivity increases.
However, the magnitude of the correlations are sensitive to the inclusion of the 
market history variables.
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identify the degree of competition in the market from other structural factors, particularly the magnitude of fixed costs.
1 Introduction
The relationship between the size of a market and the structure of  production - the number
of firms, their relative size, and the magnitude of entry and exit flows - is determined by a large
set of underlying structural factors including the competitiveness of the market, the magnitude of
sunk entry costs, the importance of economies of scale in production, the relationship between
production cost and product quality, and the magnitude of cost heterogeneity among producers.  
A number of empirical studies in industrial organization have used products that are sold
in small geographic markets to study the cross-sectional relationship between market size and
market structure.  Studies of the relationships between market size, generally measured as
population, and the number of firms in the market (Bresnahan and Reiss (1989, 1991), Asplund
and Sandin, (1999), and  Berry and Waldfogel,(2003)), the average sales of the firms (Campbell
and Hopenhayn, (2005)), and the magnitude of cost heterogeneity (Syverson, (2004)) have been
used to indirectly draw inferences about these underlying structural factors, particularly the degree
of competition in the market.   A common factor in virtually all of the empirical literature is that
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they are based on a two-period long-run equilibrium model which explains the number and size of
firms as a function of market size.  Each paper tends to focus on the cross-sectional correlation
between one aspect of market structure and market size.
The data and theoretical framework used in these studies are not well suited to examining
entry and exit flows or to identify the role that sunk entry costs might play in the evolution of
market structure.  More recently, explicit dynamic models have been developed that generate a
relationship between market size and firm turnover (Asplund and Nocke (2006) and  Pakes,
Ostrovsky and Berry, (forthcoming)).  These dynamic models distinguish incumbent producers2
from potential entrants and recognize that, when sunk entry costs are present, the value functions
of the two groups are different.  This makes an incumbent’s decision to remain in operation or
exit different from the decision of a potential entrant and leads to a framework in which market
history, specifically past market structure, is a determinant of current market structure.  With the
exception of Bresnahan and Reiss (1994), the role of past market structure has not been examined
in the empirical market structure literature.
In this paper we utilize data from the U.S. Census of Service Industries to study the
evolution of market structure in two health services industries, dentists and chiropractors.  We use 
data for the period 1977-2002 to document a set of empirical facts linking the number of firms,
and the flows of entering and exiting firms, to both market size and past market structure.  
It is particularly interesting to examine the market structures of health service industries because
the market demand is closely tied to population, so that market size should be important, and there
are substantial sunk costs involved in establishing a practice, so that the history of market
structure should also be a significant determinant.   The empirical results indicate that past market
structure, specifically the number of firms in the market in previous periods and the number of
potential entrants to the market, play an important role in determining the flow of entering and
exiting firms.  Together these imply that  market history is a significant determinant of current
market structure, as the dynamic models of entry and exit imply.  The inclusion of lagged market
structure also leads to a large reduction in the role of current market size and thus would have a
significant impact on conclusions about market competition that are based on the two-period long-
run equilibrium models. 
In the next section of the paper we review the theoretical arguments and empirical findings
from the two-period long-run models and then contrast them with an explicitly dynamic model of3
entry and exit.  The third section summarizes the market-level data we utilize, focusing on the
number of dentists and chiropractors in geographic markets in the U.S.  The fourth section
summarizes the empirical model of entry and exit we estimate and the fifth section presents the
empirical results.
2. Models of Entry, Exit, and Market Structure
2.1 The Number of Firms
The primary model that has guided empirical work on entry and exit is first outlined in a
series of papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1989, 1991) and Sutton (1991).  There are two time
periods.  In the first period, a large group of ex ante identical potential entrants make a decision to
enter the market after paying a fixed cost to enter.  In the second period,  production occurs and
profits are realized.  The second period profits are determined by the nature of competition in the
market, Cournot vs. Bertrand vs. collusion for example, and the number of firms that entered in
the first stage.  In equilibrium, the number of firms that enter will be determined by a zero net
profit condition; entry will occur until the second stage profits fall below the fixed entry cost.  
What Bresnahan and Reiss and Sutton show is that the zero profit condition can be used to guide
empirical work explaining the number of firms in the market.  
In the simplest version of this framework, all firms in a market are identical.  Let Z
represent a set of exogenous market-level variables that determine demand and cost conditions in
a market such as the number of consumers and factor prices.  Let V(N,Z) be the profits earned by
each firm in a market when there are N producers.  If ö is the common fixed cost of entry then the
equilibrium number of firms N  can described by two entry conditions:
*
(1) V(N ,Z) $ ö  and V(N +1,Z) < ö.
**4
In a market with N  firms, profits for each will cover the fixed cost, while in a market with N +  1
**
firms they will not.  Almost all empirical applications of this framework have used data on N and
Z from a cross-section of geographic markets to estimate parameters of the profit function,
particularly the effect of a change in the number of firms on profits, and the fixed cost.  If we
assume that the fixed cost in each market is an independent draw from a common normal
distribution for ö, then the equilibrium entry conditions imply an ordered probit model for the
number of firms with Z and any variables that shift the distribution of ö as the explanatory
variables in the model.  Berry and Reiss (2006) and Berry and Tamer (2006) discuss the
assumptions on V and ö that are necessary to estimate the parameters of the profit function and
fixed cost distribution in this homogenous firm framework.  In general, they show that if only N
and Z are observed and profit data is not observed, then distributional assumptions on F and
functional form restrictions on V are needed to estimate the profit and fixed cost parameters.
A particularly interesting special case, which has played a large role in the empirical
studies, is where the profit function can be written as the product of a per-customer profit function
V (N,Z) and the number of customers S: V(N,Z) =  V (N,Z) S.  In this case, S is interpreted as a
CC
measure of market size and so cross-sectional variation in market size generates cross-sectional
variation in firm profits.  In this case, the empirical relationship between N and S can be used to
draw inferences about the competitive effect of entry, that is, the effect of N on the profit function
V, without using profit data.  If this competitive effect is present in a market then entry of
additional firms into a market compresses the average markup of all firms in operation, lowering
V.  At the entry stage the market size needed to support an additional firm will be larger than if
this competitive effect is absent.  Alternatively, larger markets will support more firms but will
also have a larger average market size per firm (S/N).   A number of other papers have incorporated firm heterogeneity in the two-period framework. In his study of
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airline markets, Berry (1992) allows for differences in fixed costs across firms and models the number of firms as a
function of market and firm characteristics.  He finds that average firm profits are negatively affected by an increase in
the number of producers.  Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2002) allow for different degrees of product differentiation across
firms within the same market.  Mazzeo models the number of high-quality and low-quality firms in a market and finds
significant own and cross-effects of the number of firms of each type on the average profits of each type.  Seim allows
firms to differ in their geographic location within the market and studies the location decision of new firms.  She finds
that increasing distance between firms insulates them from the competitive effects.
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This competitive effect can show up in the market size correlations in other ways as well. 
Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) develop the implications of increased market size on the average
size of firms in the market.  If larger markets are more competitive and hence have lower
markups, then average firm size will be larger because the firms must sell more output to cover
their fixed costs.  They find evidence of this correlation in 13 U.S. retail industries.  Syverson
(2004) incorporates firm heterogeneity into the two-period framework.   Firms are allowed to
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differ in marginal costs and he shows that competitive effects can be reflected in the distribution
of costs or productivities in a market.  In his case a homogeneous product is produced by plants
with different marginal cost.  Product differentiation is introduced through the spatial dispersion
of customers and the presence of high transport costs.  Together these make each producer’s
output an imperfect substitute for the output of others.  An increase in demand density, the
number of customers per unit of area, leads to an increase in producer density which, in turn,
lowers prices and profit margins for all plants in the market and raises the failure rate of high-cost
producers.  As a result, more densely populated markets will be more efficient, having a higher
proportion of low-cost producers.  He finds empirical evidence of higher efficiency in large
markets for the U.S. ready-mix concrete industry.  
 Asplund and Nocke (2006) move beyond the two-period framework and develop a
dynamic equilibrium model in which market size has implications for the rate of firm turnover. 
The underlying competitive mechanism is similar to these other papers:  an increase in  Berry (1992) allows the fixed cost of an airline on a route to depend on whether or not the airline had a
3
presence at the endpoint cities which distinguishes incumbents from potential entrants in the endpoint markets. 
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competition as market size increases results in large markets having more firms with higher per-
firm sales but lower price-cost margins.  This results in the marginal surviving firm being more
productive in larger markets, which is reflected in higher turnover and a younger age distribution
of firms in larger markets.  They find empirical evidence supporting this for Swedish hair salons.
2.2 Entry and Exit Flows
With the exception of Asplund and Nocke (2006), the empirical literature summarized in
section 2.1 focuses on long-run differences in the number of firms, not on entry and exit flows
directly.  While the underlying two-period framework can allow for producer heterogeneity in
fixed costs or profits, which leads one firm to choose to be in the market while another chooses to
be out, it does not provide any insights into what determines the magniture of entry and exit flows. 
One aspect that is generally missed in the two-period model is the distinction between the role of
fixed costs that all producers pay and the role of sunk entry costs that are only paid by firms at the
time of entry.   This leads to a difference in the objective function and participation decision of
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incumbent and potential entrant firms.   Incumbents compare the expected sum of discounted
future profits with the scrap value they would earn by liquidating the firm.  In contrast, potential
entrants compare the discounted future payoff from entering with the sunk entry cost they must
incur.  This distinction has important implications for the way that the number of firms responds
to exogenous factors that change profits.
Sunk entry costs combined with uncertainty about future market conditions, gives rise to
hysteresis in market structure (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).  For example, suppose there is an
exogenous increase in market size that raises firm profits sufficiently to induce potential entrants
to pay the sunk cost and enter the market.  If the market size and profits then return to their initial7
levels those new firms may find it profitable to remain in operation rather than exit.  The number
of firms thus responds asymmetrically to changes in market size.  Equivalently, the history of
market structure, and not just current and future profit determinants, matters in explaining the
current number of firms.   
The level of the sunk entry cost also affects the magnitude of entry and exit flows in the
market.  Using a competitive, industry-equilibrium model, Hopenhayn (1992) shows that an
increase in the sunk entry cost will reduce the flow of entering firms in the market but also reduce
the flow of exiting firms.  The higher entry cost acts to insulate incumbent firms from the pressure
of entry and allows more inefficient incumbents to survive.  Thus the entry cost is an important
structural element affecting entry and exit flows and the degree of market efficiency.   
Recently, fully dynamic models that recognize the distinction between incumbent and
potential entrant firms have been developed that can explain differences in entry and exit flows
across markets and/or industries.  Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007), Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), Collard-Wexler (2006), and Ryan (2006) all use
micro data on firm participation patterns in a market to estimate structural models of entry and
exit, including the sunk costs of entry.
Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (forthcoming) develop a dynamic model that is very useful as
a framework  for studying the flows of entering and exiting firms in market-level data.  This leads
to a formulation for regressions of entry, exit, and the number of firms that can be distinguished
from the two-period models but estimated with the same type of cross-sectional or panel market-
level data.  We will briefly summarize this model and then use it to specify regression models of
entry and exit.  
The model assumes that in a market each firm earns identical profits given by ð(N,Z)  The expectation is over the future values of the state variables N, Z and the scrap value ö.
4
  VE(N,Z,ó)  and VC(N,Z,ó) are not identical.  The former is the expected firm value from the perspective of a
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firm which chooses to enter, and thus knows there is at least one entering firm in the market.  The latter is the expected
firm value from the perspective of an incumbent that chooses to remain in the market and thus knows there is at least one
survivor.  Each group thus has a different expectation for the number of firms N in the market in future periods.
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where N is the number of firms that operate in the period and Z is a set of exogenous cost and
demand shifters.  The state variables Z evolve exogenously over time as market conditions change
while N evolves endogenously as firms make optimal entry and exit decisions.  In each period an
incumbent faces a choice of remaining in the market in the next period or exiting.  If firm i
i chooses to exit they earn a scrap value ö , which is modeled as an independent draw from an
underlying distribution F( @   *   ó  ) where ó  is a parameter that characterizes the distribution.  The
ö
distribution is common for all firms and time periods.   If they remain in they earn expected
profits VC(N, Z,ó ) which is the expectation of the firm value in the next period and is identical for
i all incumbents in the market.   Incumbent firm i chooses to remain in the market if VC(N,Z,ó)$ö . 
4
Similarly each potential entrant faces a decision to enter at the start of the next period.  The payoff
from entering is represented as VE(N,Z,ó ) and is the same for all potential entrants in the market. 
i Each potential entrant differs in their entry cost ê which is modeled as an independent draw from
a common distribution F( @   *   â  ), where the parameter â characterizes the entry cost distribution. 
ê
i The firm enters the market if VE(N,Z,ó,) $ ê.  
This framework differs from the two-period model outlined above in several important
ways.  First, incumbents and potential entrants differ.  The latter must pay an entry cost but also
the expected firm value from continuing in production VC is different than the expected firm
value from entering VE.   Second, firm-level heterogeneity, which is absent from the simplest two
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period models,  is introduced through the random scrap value and entry cost.  This model is
capable of generating simultaneous flows of entering and exiting firms into the same market,something that simpler models with homogenous firms cannot do. 
This model results in simple expressions for the probability of entry and exit.  The
probability an incumbent firm exits from a market with current state N,Z is given by:
X (2) P (N,Z,ó)  =  Prob (VC(N,Z,ó) # ö)  = 1 - F (VC(N,Z,ó)*ó) 
ö
Since this probability is the same for all incumbents in the market, the numbering of exiting firms
X NX is a binomial random variable with the parameters P  and N, where the number of incumbent
firms is the number of trials in the process.
Similarly, the number of entering firms is also a binomial random variable.  The
probability of one firm entering the market with current state (N, Z) is:
E (3) P (N,Z,ó,â )  =  Prob (VE(N,Z,ó ) $ ê)  =  F (VE(N,Z,ó)*â ) 
ê
This probability is the same for all potential entrants to the market so the number of entering firms
E NE is a binomial random variable with parameters P  and NPE, where the latter is the number of
potential entrants to the market.  
To summarize, the theoretical model provides a basis for a statistical model of the number
of entering and exiting firms in a market.  The entry and exit flows (NX and NE) over a time
period are a function of exogenous state variables Z that affect profits in the beginning time period
(and determine values in future time periods) and the number of firms N and number of potential
entrants NPE at the beginning of the period .  In section 4 we estimate equations for the entry and
exit flows based on this specificiation.
3. Measuring Entry and Exit for Dentists and Chiropractors using Census Data 
The data used in the analysis come from US Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD). The LBD contains establishment-level data on all employers in the United States
from 1976 through 2005.  The database allows for the measurement of establishment and firm Jarmin and Miranda (2002) discuss the measurement issues involved in constructing the LBD.  
6
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dynamics across almost all sectors of the U.S. economy.   While prior research focused primarily
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on the analysis of firm dynamics in the manufacturing sector, the recent development of non-
manufacturing data allows for the analysis of producer turnover across a much wider range of
industries. 
In this paper, we examine entry and exit in two health services industries, dentists (NAICS
621210) and chiropractors (SIC 621310), where little is known about the patterns of firm
dynamics.  Dental and chiropractic services are dominated by small, single location firms typically
owned by the practicing doctor(s).  While Census data collection is establishment based, for these
industries virtually all firms are single establishment practices, particularly in the small markets
we will utilize, and we use the terms interchangeably in this paper.  These firms  provide their
services in relatively small markets with the demand for services tied closely to local market
conditions, particularly population.  The technologies are also similar across dental and
chiropractic establishments in that they combine office staff, specialized capital equipment, and
doctors’ time to provide health services.  Our analysis augments the LBD with revenue, payroll,
employment, and geographic coding data from the Census of Services limiting the data set to the
Census years of 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997 and 2002.  The remainder of this section discusses
market definitions, the measurement of entry and exit, and the construction of market-level
variables.
3.1 Defining Markets and Market Participation
Throughout this paper, we focus our attention on small and isolated geographic areas so
that we can better define the market served, similar in spirit to the approach taken by Bresnahan
and Reiss (1989, 1991).  We first identified a set cities and towns that are geographically distinct Almost all entering and exiting establishments in these data represent establishment birth and deaths. 
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However, some establishments in the data switch geographic codes over time and such geographic market switching
can generate entry and exit under our definitions. We restrict certain types of these geographic market switching.  In
particular, establishments within a county  will sometimes switch between a "rest of county" place code and a place
code identifying a city. We do not allow these within-county changes in geographic coding to generate entry and
exit. In these cases, we fix the place code to the code that identifies the city and the treat the establishment as
continuing in that location .
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from large population centers.  From this list of potential markets, we kept only those locales with
populations of less than 50,000 and consistent place coding in the Census of Services over time. 
Our markets include 754 incorporated places that vary in population from 2,500 to 50,000 people,
and are, on average, larger than the locales used by Bresnahan and Reiss.  All 754 geographic
areas had a dental practice present in at least one year; but because they require a larger population
to sustain a practice, only 689 of the geographic areas had a chiropractic practice present. 
 The measure of entry used in this paper is the entry of an establishment into one of these
geographic markets.  An entrant in a market is defined as an establishment that is not producing in
market m in period t but is producing in market m in period t+5 (the next Census year).   An exit
7
is similarly defined as an establishment that is in market m in period t and is not in that market in
period  t+5.  For each market m and in each time interval, we construct the number of entering
mt mt establishments (NE ), the number of exiting establishments (NX ) and the number of
mt establishments (N ).  The data allow us to measure entry and exit for five time intervals (1977-
1982, 1982-1987, 1987-1992, 1992-1997 and 1997-2002) and for 754 geographic markets
yielding a data set of 3770 market-time observations. 
  To give a sense of how entry and exit varies across the markets in our data, Figures 1-3
show the cumulative density of the number of establishments, number of entrants, and number of
exiting establishments.  The distribution for dentists is shifted to the right in all three panels
indicating that the number of offices per market, as well as the number of entering and exiting In these industries, dentists and chiropractors are the main generators of revenue but if the legal form of
8
organization is a sole proprietor or a partnership these owner-practitioners will not be counted in employment. To
account for this omission, we modify total employment at an establishment for sole proprietors by adding one
employee and for partnerships by adding two employees.
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producers, is larger for dentists compared to chiropractors.  The graph also shows that many of our
markets have a relatively small number of producers.  In fact, the majority of markets support less
than three chiropractors and less than eight dentists.  One difference between these two industries
is that the number of chiropractic offices grew rapidly over the period of analysis while dentists
experienced slower growth.  The average number of dentists offices in our markets grew by
16.5% whereas the growth in chiropractors offices increased by 142.5%.  Still, the number of
chiropractic offices was only 31.5% of the number of dentists offices by the end of the sample
period.  
3.2  Market Level Variables
Throughout the analysis, three variables are used to characterize market structure  – the
number of establishments (discussed above), the average size, measured as real revenue, of
producers, and the average labor productivity of producers.  We use the data from the Census of
Services to measure the average revenue of practices in a market and deflate this by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI).  Average labor productivity for a market is similarly constructed by taking real
revenue of a practice and dividing it by the establishment’s total employment and then averaging
across all producers in the market.  
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Our empirical models use three variables to capture differences in demand and cost
conditions across markets.  To control for demand differences, we include the population of the
mt geographic market and per-capita income.  Population in a market (S ) has been the main proxy
used to measure market size in most previous studies of entry.  Population figures on incorporated
places are obtained from the Census Bureau’s series on population estimates, but we interpolate Figures 1 through 9 are produced using STATA’s lowess command with a bandwidth of .3 and the default
9
weighting procedure.  The lowess command estimates a weighted regression at each observation in the data using nearby
data points to construct a smoothed value of the dependent variable conditional on the x variable.
13
the data for our places in some earlier years from the Decennial Census when population estimates
mt are unavailable.  The real per-capita-income variable (PCI ) from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis is measured at the county level and deflated by the CPI.  To control for cost differences,
mt we construct the average real wage (W ) paid to workers employed in the health practitioners’
offices (NAICS 62111-621399) in the county, again deflating by the national CPI.  Because we do
not have local price deflators, variation in the wage and income variables will also reflect price-
level differences across geographic markets, which are likely to be important in these data. 
The dynamic entry model from section 2.2 implies that the history of market structure
matters in determining current market structure.  Two variables are used to control for history in
our empirical models – the lagged or beginning period number of firms in a market and the lagged
mt or beginning period number of potential entrants (NPE ) that were present in the market.  The
number of potential entrants into a geographic market in a time-period is equal to the maximum
number of different establishments that appear in the market over time minus the current number
of establishments in operation. The rationale behind this definition is that in each geographic
market we observe all potential entrants being active at some point in time.  In each time period
the pool of potential entrants is the set of establishments that are not currently active.
A main focus of prior work has been an examination of how the number of firms in a
market varies with market size.  Figure 4 graphs this relationship for dentists and chiropractors
using a locally weighted regression.    Larger markets support a larger number of practices in both
9
industries and, as noted above, the number of dental practices per capita is significantly greater
than chiropractic practices per capita.  Our largest markets support in excess of 20 dentists per14
market while for chiropractors the largest markets only support about five producers.  Since
chiropractic offices also have lower revenue, on average, than dentist offices, the data reflect the
fact that per-capita demand for chiropractic services is much less than dental services.   Figures 5
and 6 graph the relationship between market population and the number of entering and exiting
establishments.  The same general patterns hold – there are a greater number of entering and
exiting dentists per-capita than chiropractors. 
4. Empirical Model of Entry, Exit and Number of Firms
The dynamic model of section 2.2 implies that the number of entering and exiting firms is
a function of the market characteristics that affect current and future profits, the distribution of
scrap values and entry costs, and the number of firms and potential entrants that are present.  In
this section we specify the estimating equations that we will apply to the market level data for
dentists and chiropractors.  
The theoretical model from section 2.2 specifies the number of entering and exiting firms
as binomial random variables.  We could specify the probabilities of entry and exit as functions of
the observable state variables and unknown parameters and estimate them using maximum
likelihood.  The estimation of entry probabilities depends critically on the measurement of the
mt number of potential entrants (NPE ) and this variable is difficult to measure accurately.  Instead
we choose to model the mean number of entering and exiting firms directly and use NPE as one
explanatory variable.  If it is measured poorly it may still be possible to determine if the other
state variables are significant determinants of entry flows.  Since the entry and exit flows are
count variables, we use an extension of the Poisson model.  Given the panel of 754 geographic
markets for five five-year periods we specify the flows of entering and exiting practices using a15
negative binomial regression model.
 The mean number of exiting plants is a function of the market-level state variables and
the number of potential entrants:
mt mt-1 mt-1, mt-1 (4) E(NX  / N , Z  NPE ) = 
0 1 mt-1 2 mt-1 3 mt-1 4 mt-1 5 mt-1 j mj exp(â  + â logS  + â  log(PCI ) + â  logW  + â  N +  â  NPE  +  3ã D)
mj where the D  is a set of four dummy variables to distinguish the five time periods in the data. 
The variables are all specified at the start of the time period (t-1) and the number of exits is
measured over the time interval t-1 to t.  The negative binomial model generalizes the Poisson
model to allow the variance of the distribution to be greater than the mean using the specification:
mt mt X mt (5)  Var(NX ) = E(NX )(1+ á  E(NX )) .
X This introduces one new parameter á  which is referred to as the overdispersion parameter.  The
X Poisson model is the special case where á  = 0. 
 A similar equation is specified for the mean entry flow:
mt mt-1 mt-1, mt-1 (6) E(NE  / N , Z  NPE ) = 
0 1 mt-1 2  mt-1 3  mt-1 4  mt-1 5 mt-1 j mj  exp(ù  + ù logS  + ù log(PCI ) + ù logW  + ù N +  ù NPE  +  3ä D)
where  NE is measured over the time interval  t-1 to t.  We also allow for overdispersion in the entry
model using the specification in equation (5).  It is important to recognize that the coefficients in
these entry and exit flow regressions are combinations of profit function, sunk cost, and entry cost
parameters and these underlying structural parameters are not separately identified. 
Combining the entry and exit models also provides  a way to describe the number of firms
in year t that is consistent with the dynamic model of entry and exit.  The number of firms in year t
mt mt-1 mt mt. can be written as N  = N  + NE  - NX    Using equations 4 and 6 for NE and NX we can write
mt N  as a function of the state variables, lagged number of firms, and number of potential entrants:   16
mt mt-1 mt-1, mt-1 (7) E(N  / N , Z  NPE ) = 
0 1  mt-1 2  mt-1 3  mt-1 4 mt-1 5  mt-1 j mj exp(è  + è logS  + è log(PCI ) + è logW  + è N +  è NPE  +  3ç D)
Notice that this differs from the specification of N from the two-period models because it depends
on lagged N and the number of potential entrants NPE.   One way to distinguish the two-period and
fully dynamic models is by whether these two variables are significant in the model for the number
of firms. 
 We have estimated both negative binomial and Poisson models and in most cases the
amount of overdispersion is relatively small and the coefficient estimates are similar.  To simplify
discussion, we report only the negative binomial estimates of equations 4-7 in the next section.
5. Empirical Evidence on Entry, Exit, and Market Structure
5.1 Market Structure and Market Size  
 Before turning to the regression analysis, we present graphs showing the relationship
between market size and market structure for our health service industries.  Figures 7-9 depict a set
of locally weighted regressions for three variables that describe features of our local markets –
population per firm (S/N), average revenue per firm, and average firm productivity.  These
variables, measured in logs, are plotted against log S in the market.  For both industries, average
revenue per producer and average labor productivity rise as market size increases though there are
some differences in the shape of this relationship between the industries.  The rise in average
revenue and average labor productivity is greatest for small markets and then flattens out in the
larger markets for dentists.  However, for chiropractors, the rise in average revenues and labor
productivity is most pronounced in mid-size markets.  Recall that small markets support very few
chiropractors and it is only as markets become mid-sized that we are likely to see multiple17
chiropractors operating.  These increases in average revenue and average labor productivity with
market size are consistent with previous empirical research.  Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005)
finds that average sales per producer rises with market size and Syverson (2004) reports that
productivity is higher in larger markets.  Both interpret these patterns as consistent with more
intense competition in larger markets.   The relationship between log(S/N) and log S shown in
Figure 7 does not provide a uniform picture across the industries.  For chiropractors, population per
producer rises as market size increases.  Again, under the conditions described in Berry and Reiss
(2006), this pattern is consistent with more competition in larger markets.  Alternatively, dentists
show a much more muted rise in average population per practice as market size increases
suggesting less of a competitive effect.    
To control for other variables, Table 1 reports the coefficients from regressions of the
number of producers, the average revenue of practices, and average labor productivity in a market
on our demand and cost variables.  The regression of the number of producers is estimated using
the negative binomial count data model for comparability with dynamic model results that are
reported below.  The log average revenue and log labor productivity models are estimated using
ordinary least squares and all models contain year dummies. 
The coefficient on market population in the regression for number of establishments (N), is
an estimate of the elasticity of N with respect to S and is less than one for both industries, .830 for
dentists and .671 for chiropractors.  If a competitive effect is present, then the coefficient on market
size should be less than one.  As observed in Figure 7, chiropractic services appears to have a
somewhat stronger competitive effect.  One reason for this difference between these industries is
that, compared to dentists, a much higher percentage of the markets served by chiropractors have
two or fewer producers (see Figure 1).  Bresnahan and Reiss found that for their industries the18
competitive effect was dissipated by the time there were 3 firms in the market.  Given the relatively
small number of chiropractors operating in many of the markets, it is more likely to find deviations
from competitive outcomes in this industry.  
The positive relationship between market size and both revenue and labor productivity in
these industries can also be interpreted as evidence that a competitive effect of entry is present. 
The estimated elasticity of average revenue is .108 in dentists and .137 in chiropractic services.
Although these elasticities are somewhat greater than those reported by Campbell and Hopenhayn
(2005) using similar models, it is consistent with their argument that a competitive effect will
result in larger firms in larger markets.  The larger magnitudes found here may reflect the fact that
the markets used in this study are generally smaller and thus more likely to be affected by
competitive pressure from entry.  Syverson’s (2005) model predicts that productivity will be higher
in larger markets due to a more intense selection effect and the results are consistent with his
findings.  The elasticity of average productivity with respect to market size is .053 and .074 in the
dentist and chiropractor industries, respectively. 
The other demand variable, the log of per-capita income, has a positive elasticity in all three
market structure regressions for both industries.  These results probably reflect the fact that as
incomes rise a greater share of the population uses the services and/or consumers use the service
more intensively, resulting in higher market demand, more firms, and higher average revenue.  The
latter effect could also arise from increased product differentiation and higher prices in wealthier
markets.  The wage variable has the expected positive sign in the average revenue and productivity
regressions, since revenue must rise to cover higher costs, but the positive coefficient in the
regressions for the number of producers is unexpected.  This suggests that the market wage
variable in these regressions not only picks differences in factor costs across locations but also19
differences in cost-of-living.   Markets with higher cost of living  will have higher output prices
and the net effect of these input and output price changes on profitability is ambiguous.  Finally,
the alpha parameter estimated from the negative binomial models of the number of producers
indicates that overdispersion is present in the model for dentists but not for chiropractors. 
5.2 Entry and Exit
The regression specifications in Table 1 are motivated by the two-period models of entry
summarized in section 2.1.  The empirical results for the effect of  market size are similar to other
empirical studies using this framework and these have generally been interpreted as reflecting a
competitive effect of entry.  The dynamic model of section 2.2 provides a different starting point
for the modeling of market structure and indicates that the lagged number of firms and number of
potential entrants are determinants of entry and exit flows and thus current market structure. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide results for models that include these additional explanatory variables.      
Table 2 reports the results of negative binomial models using the number of entering and
exiting firms as the dependent variables.  The most interesting finding in the table is the role played
by the controls for the number of firms and the number of potential entrants at the beginning of the
period.  These regressions are reported in the even-numbered columns in the table.  The model in
section 2.2 implies that an increase in N should reduce the profit stream from being in the market
and so reduce the number of entrants (NE) and increase the number of exits (NX).  The model
implies an additional effect on exit, holding the profit stream fixed, because an increase in the
number of firms making the continuation decision means that the expected number of firms
observing a scrap value larger than the value of remaining in the industry, and thus choosing to
exit, will rise.  Overall, there should be a positive correlations between N and NX and a negative20
correlation between N and NE.  The predicted positive correlation between  N and NX is observed
for both industries and the coefficients, .050 in dentists and .211 in chiropractors, are highly
significant.  The correlation can reflect either, or both, of the exit linkages in the model and it is not
possible using these regressions to identify the separate contribution of each mechanism.  The
predicted negative relationship between N and NE is not observed in the dentist industry and is
observed, but is not statistically significant, for chiropractors.  Both coefficients are small when
compared with the impact of an increase in the number of potential entrants and this may reflect
the second-order impact of an increase in N affecting the number of entrants through its effect on
the value of entering.
The dynamic model predicts that an increase in the number of  potential entrants NPE
lowers the discounted value of expected future profits by increasing the expected number of firms
operating in the future.. This will lead to less entry and more exit.  It has a second impact on the
number of entrants.  An increase in the number of potential entrants, holding the profit stream
fixed,  will increase the expected number of firms that draw an entry cost less than the value of
entering and thus choose to enter.  So the correlation between NPE  and NX should be positive
while the correlation between NPE and NE is ambiguous.  The positive relationship between NPE
and NX is observed, the coefficent is .004 for both industries but is only statistically significant for
dentists.  The estimated relationship between NPE and NE is positive and statistically significant,
.043 in dentists and .115 in chiropractors.  This suggests that the direct effect of an increase in the
size of the pool of potential entrants is more important for the entry flow than the indirect or
secondary effect this has on the future profit stream.  Overall, the importance of N and NPE as
control variables in these regressions provides some support for the dynamic framework. 
The second set of results that is of interest in Table 2 concerns the coefficients on the21
demand and cost variables and how these are affected when lagged market structure variables are
included.  In models that do not control for N and NPE, reported in the odd-numbered columns of
Table 2, the coefficients on the demand and cost variables are all positive indicating that markets
with larger population, per-capita income, and wage rates (or price levels) have more producer
turnover, that is, both higher entry and exit.  Unlike the regressions in Table 1, there is no
competition interpretation linked to these results.  When N and NPE are included in the regressions
the magnitude of each of these coefficients is substantially reduced.  For example, comparing the
first two columns, the coefficient on the market size variable falls from .839 to .338 when the two
variables are included.  This is true in all the entry and exit models and suggests that any
conclusions we draw based on the relationship between the demand and cost variables and market
structure may be sensitive to whether we base the empirical model on the two-period, long-run
equilibrium model or an explicitly dynamic one. 
To explore this last point further we reestimate the market structure models reported in
Table 1 but now include the lagged number of firms and potential entrants as additional control
variables.  These findings are reported in Table 3.  First, the lagged number of firms and potential
entrants are both significant variables in the regressions for the number of firms, columns 1 and 4. 
The importance of these variables is one way to discriminate between the dynamic models which
allow for the possibility of hysteresis in market structure, and the two-period models which do not. 
In addition, for both industries, the other estimated coefficients in these two columns are sensitive
to the inclusion of these market history variables.  The magnitude of the coefficients on population,
per-capita income, and the wage rate all drop markedly in comparison to those reported in Table 1. 
Of particular interest is the effect on the coefficients of the market size variable, since these have
been the focus of most attention in the empirical literature.  In the dentist industry, the coefficient22
on market population drops from .830 in Table 1 to .316 in Table 3.  The corresponding
coefficients for chiropractors are .671 and .296.  While all the coefficients are significantly
different than one and would, if the two-period model was taken literally, imply a competitive
effect of entry, the magnitude of the effect is clearly very different between model specifications. 
This raises questions about how to interpret the estimated relationship between the size of a market
and the number of firms.
In contrast to the model of the number of firms, there is little systematic relationship
between the lagged market structure variables and either the average revenue or labor productivity
variables.  The most significant correlations appear between the number of potential entrants and
the average revenue and productivity variables for dentists.  Still, the results in Table 3 suggest that
the lagged market structure variables are determinants of current market structure, particularly the
number of firms in the market, as implied by the dynamic model of entry and exit.   This only
serves to further complicate the interpretation of the regression coefficients in this type of model,
since they now reflect much more than a possible competitive effect of entry.   
6. Conclusion
This paper utilizes U.S. Census micro data to study patterns of producer dynamics in two
health service industries, dentists and chiropractors.  The analysis is guided by studies in the
industrial organization literature that quantify the relationship between market size and market
structure, where the latter is measured in several ways including the number of firms, the average
size of firms, and the level of productivity.  The framework is extended to incorporate the analysis
of entry and exit flows.  Recent models of producer dynamics stress the different decisions faced
by incumbent firms and potential entrants.   In particular, the existence of a sunk entry cost implies23
that the decision of an incumbent producer to remain in a market differs in fundamental ways from
the decision of a new firm to enter the market.  One implication of these recent models is that entry
flows, exit flows, and current market structure depend not only on current demand and cost
conditions but also on the history of participation decisions.
In order to empirically examine the determinants of entry, exit, and market structure, we
use census data for 754 small, geographically isolated markets for dentists and chiropractor
services and follow these markets over a 25-year time span.  We find a significant role for both the
past number of firms and the number of potential entrants as determinants of current market
structure and this is consistent with the dynamic model of entry and exit we rely on.  Our empirical
findings also show that as market size increases the number of firms rises less than proportionally,
firm average size increases, and average productivity in the market increases.  All of these patterns
replicate findings of other studies that have been used to infer that markets become more
competitive as they increase in size.  However, we find the magnitudes of these correlations,
particularly for the number of firms,  are sensitive to the inclusion of the market history variables
and this suggests caution in interpreting the cross-market regressions as revealing much about the
competitive structure of the market.  
The relationship between the size of a market, the magnitude of barriers to entry including
the size of entry costs, and the competitiveness of a market is an issue of long-standing interest in
industrial organization.  Changes in market size affect firm profitability but also generate flows of
entry and exit which also impact profitability.  These entry and exit flows are determined, in part,
by the magnitude of sunk entry costs, which are very hard to measure and control for in empirical
work.  The correlations between market size and the number of firms, entry flows, and exit flows
will reflect the interaction of these entry barriers, magnitude of competition in the market, and24
expected future changes in market conditions and profitability.   In Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and
Xu (2007) we utilize U.S. Census micro data to estimate an empirical model of entry, exit, and
profitability to identify these separate components of market structure and performance.  One key
to future empirical work in the area of producer dynamics is micro data that can track the evolution
of firms and markets over time.  Producer data sets that cover a broader range of sectors, countries,
and time periods is a crucial component of future research on the sources and impacts of producer
dynamics.    25
References
Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2007), “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,”
Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 1-53.
Asplund, M. and V. Nocke (2006), “Firm Turnover in Imperfectly Competitive Markets,” The
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 295-327.
Asplund, M. and R. Sandin (1999), “The Number of Firms and Production Capacity in Relation to
Market Size,” Journal of Industrial Economics,Vol. 47, pp. 69-85.
Berry, S. (1992), “Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry,” Econometrica, Vol. 60,
No. 4, pp. 889-917.
Berry, S. and P. Reiss (2006), “Empirical Models of Entry and Market Structure, Handbook of
Industrial Organization Vol III.
Berry, S. and E. Tamer (2006), “Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry,” working paper.
Berry, S and J. Waldfogel (2003), “Product Quality and Market Size,” NBER Working Paper 9675.
Bresnahan, T. and P. Reiss (1989), “Do Entry Conditions Vary Across Markets?” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics Annual, Vol. 1, pp. 833-882.
Bresnahan, T. and P. Reiss (1991), “Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 5, pp. 977-1009.
Bresnahan, T. and P. Reiss (1994), “Measuring the Importance of Sunk Costs,” Annales
D'Economie et de Statistique, No. 34, pp.181-217.
Campbell, J. and H. Hopenhayn (2005), “Market Size Matters,” Journal of Industrial Economics,
Vol. 53, No. 1. pp. 1-25.
Collard-Wexler, A.(2006), “Plant Turnover and Demand Fluctuation in the Ready-Mix Concrete
Industry,” Center for Economic Studies Working Paper 06-08, U.S. Census Bureau.
Das, S., M.J. Roberts and J. Tybout (2007), “Market Entry Costs, Producer Heterogeneity, and
Export Dynamics,” Econometrica, Vol. 75, No.3, pp.837-873.
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994), Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press.
Dunne, T., S.D. Klimek, M.J. Roberts, and Y. Xu (2007), “Entry and Exit in Geographic Markets,”
The Pennsylvania State University, Working Paper.
Hopenhayn, H. (1992), “Entry, Exit, and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium,”26
Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 5, pp. 1127-1150.  
Jarmin, R. and J. Miranda (2002), “The Longitudinal Business Database,” Center for Economic
Studies Working Paper 02-14, U.S. Census Bureau.
Mazzeo, M.J. (2002), “Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure,” The Rand Journal of
Economics, Vol 33, No. 2, pp. 221-242.
Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky and S. Berry (forthcoming), “Simple Estimators for Parameters of
Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples),” The Rand Journal of Economics.
Pesendorfer, M. and P. Schmidt-Dengler (2003), “Identification and Estimation of Dynamic
Games,” NBER Working Paper 9726.
Ryan, S. (2006), “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Regulated Industry,” MIT Working
Paper.
Seim, K. (2006), “An Empirical Model of Firm Entry with Endogenous Product-Type Choices,”
The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol37, No. 3, pp.619-642.
Sutton, J. (1991), Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press.
Syverson, C. (2004), “Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example,” The Journal of
























































































































N 3762 3740 3739 3762 3052 3052
R-square .189 .299 .212 .145 .113 .066
* Use negative binomial model for the number of firms.  Remaining regressions are OLSTable 2.  Models of the Number of Entrants and Exits (Negative Binomial)
Dentists Chiropractors
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N 3010 2945 2945 3010 2147 2144
R-square .282 .326 .183 .222 .104 .072
* Use negative binomial model for the number of firms.  Remaining regressions are OLSFigure 1: Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Dentists and Chiropractors in Local Markets
Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Entering Dentists and Chiropractors in Local
MarketsFigure 3: Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Exiting Dentists and Chiropractors in Local
Markets
Figure 4: Number of Producers by Market SizeFigure 5: Number of Entrants by Market Size
Figure 6: Number of Exits by Market SizeFigure 7: Log of Population-per-Producer by Market SizeFigure 8: Log of Average Revenue per Producer by Market Size
Figure 9: Log of Average Labor Productivity